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NOTES
SLIDING DOWN A SLIPPERY SLOPE? THE
FUTURE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
SUBPOENAS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
Risa Berkower*
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical situation: FBI agents suspect
that a local doctor is defrauding health insurance companies by over-
billing them. Although the agents do not have probable cause to get a
search warrant for the doctor's record room, they can use an
administrative subpoena to mandate production of the doctor's
records. If the records obtained by the subpoena reveal fraud, a
United States Attorney can prosecute the doctor using this evidence.
In criminal proceedings, investigators' access to business records
and other private documents is limited by the Fourth Amendment's
search warrant requirement' and the Fifth Amendment's grand jury
requirement.2 However, as part of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), Congress delegated
administrative subpoena power to the Attorney General to conduct
criminal investigations into federal health care fraud.' Administrative
subpoena power enables government investigators to bypass the
Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement to obtain private
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Daniel Richman for his thoughtful advice and guidance with this
Note. I am also grateful for the love, support, and encouragement of my parents,
Jackie and Ira, my sisters, Ariel and Simone, and, of course, Sam.
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2. U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury .... ").
3. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"),
Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 248, 110 Stat. 1936, 2018 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (2000)).
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records.' Congress granted this power in reaction to public outcry
against this increasingly prevalent crime and its effect on the rising
cost of health care.' In a May 2002 report to Congress, the
Department of Justice's Office of Legal Policy found that Congress
had granted health care fraud investigators a highly effective
investigatory tool. Administrative subpoenas proved extremely useful
to both investigators and prosecutors because, unlike traditional
investigatory tools, the subpoenas enabled law enforcement agents
acting on mere suspicion to access private information and placed few
prohibitions on the use of that information.'
Consider a second hypothetical situation: FBI agents suspect that
an al-Qaeda sleeper cell may be planning a chemical attack in a
particular city. The agents want to obtain all sales records from
hardware stores in the area to see if any large chemical purchases
were recently made. However, since the agents do not have probable
cause to get a search warrant, they cannot pursue this lead.
The success with which federal agents and prosecutors have used
the HIPAA administrative subpoenas raises the question of whether
this power should be expanded to other types of criminal
investigations.7 Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the
federal government has pushed to make terrorism investigations
easier and more effective.' One proposal would grant the FBI
administrative subpoena power to obtain easier access to business
records and other private documents in terrorism investigations,9 such
as in the second hypothetical above. However, administrative
subpoena power is useful in a criminal investigation primarily because
it enables investigators to bypass the Fourth Amendment's probable
4. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (rejecting probable cause as the
standard governing Internal Revenue Service administrative subpoenas); see SEC v.
Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1984) (holding that the standards set in
Powell govern all administrative subpoenas).
5. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-496, at 66-69 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1865, 1866-68.
6. See Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report to Congress on the
Use of Administrative Subpoena Authorities by Executive Branch Agencies and
Entities 35 (2002) [hereinafter DOJ Report], available at
http://www.justice.gov/olp/intro.pdf. The report, required by the Presidential Threat
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-544, § 7, 114 Stat. 2715, 2719, found that in
2001 federal prosecutors issued 2102 administrative subpoenas for health care fraud
investigations. See DOJ Report, supra, at 40-41 tbl. 1.
7. See Republican Policy Comm., Updating the Law to Confront New
Challenges: Should Postal Inspectors Have More Power than Federal Terrorism
Investigators? [hereinafter Updating the Law], available at
http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Sept0904JetsSDAH.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
8. See Alfred Cumming & Todd Masse, Congressional Research Service, FBI
Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress 1, 4
(Apr. 6, 2004) [hereinafter FBI Intelligence Reform], available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/32038.pdf.
9. See S. 2555, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 3037, 108th Cong. (2003).
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cause requirement for criminal investigations'°-a requirement that
protects not only criminal suspects' privacy rights, but also the rights
of innocent individuals from unreasonable government intrusions.
Because of this, using administrative subpoenas in broad terrorism
investigations would implicate Fourth Amendment rights on a grand
scale.
Since the social costs of terrorism are infinitely higher than that of
health care fraud, if constitutional criminal procedures can be
compromised to combat health care fraud it might make sense to do
the same for fighting terrorism. As President George W. Bush stated,
"'[ilf we can use these [administrative] subpoenas to catch crooked
doctors ... the Congress should allow law enforcement officials to use
them in catching terrorists."'11  However, this reasoning could also
create a slippery slope of exceptions and allowances to traditional
criminal processes that would ultimately erode the constitutional
safeguards built into all criminal investigations.
This Note addresses the Fourth Amendment implications of giving
administrative subpoena power to the FBI for use in criminal
investigations. Part L.A explains the probable cause requirement and
how investigators use the traditional criminal processes of search
warrants and grand jury subpoenas to obtain private information.
Part I.B compares these criminal processes to the development of
administrative investigatory subpoenas. Part I.C discusses the
modern-day intersection of civil and criminal investigative processes,
the federal judiciary's reaction to this, and the current limitations on
the use of administrative subpoena power in criminal investigations.
Part I.D follows by detailing why proposals to grant administrative
subpoena power to the FBI for terrorism investigations were
introduced in both houses of Congress.
Parts II.A and II.B explain the arguments for and against giving the
FBI administrative subpoena power for terrorism investigations in
light of the implications for Fourth Amendment rights.
Finally, Part III concludes that terrorism administrative subpoenas
would seriously undermine Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Part
III.A argues that the justifications for abrogating Fourth Amendment
rights in health care fraud investigations are neither analogous nor
compelling for terrorism and other criminal investigations. Part III.B
contends that terrorism administrative subpoenas would carry
significant secondary implications for Fourth Amendment rights even
if persuasive reasons justify granting the FBI this subpoena power. In
10. See Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 263 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that no
probable cause is required to issue an administrative subpoena under Section 248 of
HIPAA); United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000) (same).
11. See David E. Sanger, President Urging Wider U.S. Powers in Terrorism Law,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 2003, at Al (quoting President Bush's Sept. 10, 2002 address at
the FBI training academy in Quantico, Virginia).
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the alternative, Part III.C recommends measures that Congress
should take to prevent damage to individuals' Fourth Amendment
rights in other criminal investigations.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTAL TOOLS TO
OBTAIN PRIVATE INFORMATION
This part describes the history of civil and criminal investigatory
tools, and how civil subpoenas first came to be used in criminal
investigations. Part I.A provides background information on
traditional criminal investigatory tools. Part I.B explains the
development of civil subpoena power. Part I.C discusses the first
congressional provision for civil subpoena power in a criminal
investigation and the federal appellate opinions addressing that
provision. Finally, Part 1.D introduces the current debate regarding
the use of administrative subpoenas in terrorism investigations.
A. Traditional Criminal Procedures to Obtain Private Information
Traditionally, information gathering for criminal investigations
requires that law enforcement officers have a search warrant or a
grand jury subpoena.12
1. Search Warrants and the Probable Cause Requirement
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court requires that
law enforcement officers conduct all searches and seizures pursuant to
a valid search warrant that is supported by probable cause.13 The
probable cause requirement means that before law enforcement
officers can invade an individual's privacy, they must have some
evidence that the search will reveal criminal activity. 4 The probable
cause requirement exists to protect all individuals and their
possessions from indiscriminate government searches and seizures, 5
and it "has roots that are deep in our [nation's] history." 6  The
framers of the Fourth Amendment included the probable cause
requirement in reaction to the arbitrary abuses of police power
suffered under the British Crown. 7  By preventing unjustified,
excessive state searches, the probable cause requirement protects
12. See U.S. Const. amends. IV-V.
13. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 4.1, at 441 (4th ed. 2004).
14. See Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stem, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth
Amendment, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 777, 786 (2004).
15. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L.
Rev. 349, 411 (1974).
16. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
17. See Gould & Stern, supra note 14, at 791-92.
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innocent individuals from baseless searches18 and legitimizes the
governmental intrusions of privacy that do take place. 9
Aside from a few carefully defined exceptions, "a search of private
property without proper consent [violates the Fourth Amendment]
unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant [that is
supported by probable cause]."2  A search warrant "is a judicial
authorization to a law enforcement officer to search or seize persons
or things. '21 To obtain a search warrant, a law enforcement officer
must prove to a judge that there is probable cause to support the
warrant.22 Search warrants "serve[] a high function '23 because the
right to be "free from unreasonable governmental intrusion [stands]
at the very core of the Fourth Amendment.
24
The search warrant requirement recognizes that neutral magistrates
uninvolved with an investigation can make a better decision as to
whether probable cause justifies a search than law enforcement
officers "'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime. ' ' 25  Physical searches can be an immediate and substantial
privacy intrusion.26 By requiring that only neutral judicial officers can
issue search warrants upon a demonstration of probable cause, the
Fourth Amendment places an important checkpoint for judicial
supervision between the government and the people.27
Search warrants, however, are not always the most effective
investigative tool. Because of the probable cause requirement,
investigators cannot use search warrants in cases of mere suspicion.28
Also, since search warrants are issued without prior notice,29 can be
18. See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1456, 1464 (1996).
19. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561-62 (2004); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 236 (1983) ("[Pjossession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or search
greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct."); United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (noting that a warrant "assures the individual
whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer,
his need to search, and the limits of his power to search"); Stephen A. Saltzburg &
Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure: Cases and Commentary 89-90 (7th
ed. 2004).
20. Groh, 540 U.S. at 560 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29
(1967)).
21. United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000).
22. See Saltzburg & Capra, supra note 19, at 91.
23. Groh, 540 U.S. at 557 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455
(1948)).
24. Id. (quoting Kyello v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (internal
quotations omitted)).
25. 2 LaFave, supra note 13, § 4.1(a), at 442 (quoting Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
26. Bailey, 228 F.3d at 348.
27. Id. (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981)).
28. Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging
Streams of Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 573, 575 (1994).
29. See Bailey, 228 F.3d at 348.
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executed immediately, 30  and are often executed with force
constituting an "unanticipated physical intrusion,"'" warrants may be
an unnecessarily harsh and intrusive means of obtaining information
from third parties who might be willing to surrender information on
demand.32 Recognizing this, the United States Attorney's Criminal
Resource Manual counsels that warrants should not be used in a
criminal investigation if the information sought can be obtained
through other less intrusive means.33 Finally, warrants can only
authorize the seizure of goods, effects, and papers-they cannot be
used to compel testimony.34
Although search warrants authorize potentially invasive searches
and seizures, warrants can only be challenged after execution by a
motion to suppress any evidence obtained in the search, on the
grounds that the search was unreasonable. The challenging party
usually bears the burden of proving that a search executed with a
warrant was unreasonable because district courts give deference to
the neutral judicial officer's finding of probable cause for the search.36
However, third parties lack standing to challenge the validity of a
search that may affect the third party's privacy interests, such as the
search of a business premises that contained the party's private
records.37
30. See 2 LaFave, supra note 13, § 4.7, at 645-60. Although notice is required, the
notice can be given immediately before the warrant is executed. See 2 id. § 4.8, at 660-
702.
31. Bailey, 228 F.3d at 348 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316
(1978)).
32. Hughes, supra note 28, at 575.
33. Specifically, warrants are only authorized if reliance on alternative means
would "substantially jeopardize [the] availability.., or usefulness [of the
information]." Dept. of Justice, United States Attorney's Manual, 28 C.F.R. § 59.1
(2005). Title II of the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 requires the Attorney General
to
issue guidelines for the procedures to be employed by any Federal officer or
employee, in connection with the investigation or prosecution of an offense,
to obtain documentary materials in the private possession of a person when
the person is not reasonably believed to be a suspect in such offense... and
when the materials sought are not contraband or the fruits or
instrumentalities of an offense.
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11 (2000).
34. Hughes, supra note 28, at 575.
35. 2 LaFave, supra note 13, § 4.1f, at 471-75.
36. 6 id. § 11.2b, at 43-44.
37. 6 id. § 11.3d, at 190-91 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
(seizure of bank records cannot be challenged by customer)); see also United States v.
Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 1998) (phone records seized from phone
company could not be challenged by customer).
[Vol. 732256
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2. Grand Jury Subpoenas
Law enforcement agents and prosecutors can also access private
information by grand jury subpoenas.38 Grand juries serve both an
indicting and an investigatory function.39 As a consequence, a grand
jury may uncover evidence that leads to formal criminal charges, but
its investigation may also clear innocent suspects.40 Ordinarily, grand
juries screen prosecutors' cases to determine whether the prosecutor
has enough evidence against a suspect to support criminal charges.4
During an investigation into a crime, the grand jury possesses the
broadest subpoena power known in law to compel witness testimony
or to produce evidence.42 Failure to comply with a grand jury
subpoena is punishable by civil or criminal contempt.43
The standards for issuing a grand jury subpoena are lower than for
issuing a search warrant,' and the grand jury's investigation is
afforded broad scope.45 Whereas law enforcement officers must have
probable cause to get a search warrant, and warrants must specify the
location to be searched and the items to be seized,46 grand juries can
investigate "merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even
just because it wants assurance that it is not."47  To fulfill this
investigatory mission, grand juries must "paint[] with a broad brush,"
until "'every available clue has been run down and all witnesses
examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been
committed."'48  Because of this, grand jury investigations can be
especially effective to investigate crimes with no identifiable victim.49
38. 1 Sara Sun Beale et al., Grand Jury Law and Practice § 1:7, at 1-32 to 1-33 (2d
ed. 2001).
39. 1 Id. at 1-31; see Daniel C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks
in an Empty Bucket, 36 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 339, 342-45 (1999) [hereinafter Richman,
Grand Jury Secrecy].
40. See 1 Beale et al., supra note 38, § 1:7, at 1-31 to 1-32.
41. 1 id. This function of the grand jury is frequently and harshly criticized in the
academic literature as a farce in which the grand jury acts as a rubber stamp for
prosecutors-the often quoted accusation is that "a Grand Jury would indict a 'ham
sandwich."' In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Stewart, 545 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 n.1 (App.
Div. 1989) (quoting the Chief Justice of the New York Court of Appeals's publicly
stated skepticism about grand juries). For an interesting discussion about the role of
grand juries in the modern federal criminal justice system, see generally Niki Kuckes,
The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1
(2004).
42. 1 Beale et al., supra note 38, § 1:7, at 1-32 to 1-33, § 5:1, at 5-5.
43. 1 id. § 6:1, at 6-4.
44. 1 id. § 6:3, at 6-19 (no probable cause required).
45. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).
46. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
47. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950).
48. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (quoting Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972)).
49. 1 Beale et al., supra note 38, § 1:7, at 1-33. Examples include business crime,
political corruption, and organized crime where witnesses often are also participants
in the crime. 1 id. § 6:1, at 6-4.
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Grand jury subpoenas also enable third parties, such as a bank or
other business, to give up private information about criminal suspects
without risk.5" A subpoena's legal force enables a third party to
explain its cooperation with authorities as required by law, and not a
desire to "turn in" a customer, despite authorities' lack of probable
cause.51  Although the prosecutor, and not the grand jury itself,
decides what witnesses and evidence to subpoena,52 a prosecutor can
only issue subpoenas to further the grand jury's investigation of a
crime. 53 However, the technical procedural and evidentiary rules that
govern criminal trials do not constrain grand juries; grand juries may
compel the production of evidence as they consider appropriate.54
The grand jury's extensive power is subject to two important
limitations. First, the grand jury can only investigate criminal matters,
and all grand jury proceedings are secret pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Second, the grand jury cannot compel
testimony or demand physical evidence for any purpose other than a
criminal investigation.56  This limitation recognizes a compromise'
between the public interest in investigating crimes and limiting
intrusions to privacy-since the public interest is higher in solving
crime than in investigating civil matters, broader investigatory
techniques are acceptable for criminal cases but not for civil cases.
57
Additionally, a complex set of rules keep grand jury proceedings
secret, albeit with important exceptions. 8  The Supreme Court
identified five justifications for grand jury secrecy that the Court still
accepts: (1) to prevent criminal suspects from fleeing; (2) to ensure
that the grand jury can deliberate freely, without pressure from
interested parties; (3) to prevent witness tampering or subornation of
perjury; (4) to encourage witnesses to testify fully and honestly; and
(5) to protect the privacy of accused parties who are ultimately
50. 1 id. § 6:1, at 6-7.
51. Id.
52. Prosecutors often make these decisions independently because they can
require technical knowledge of the law. 1 id. § 6:2, at 6-12; see also Andrew D.
Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L.
Rev. 260, 315-16 (1995).
53. 1 Beale et al., supra note 38, § 6:2, at 6-12 to 6-14 (subpoenas not issued to
further the grand jury's investigation into a crime are an abuse of the grand jury's
subpoena authority).
54. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 298 (1991).
55. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) (rule governing the recording of grand jury proceedings,
the secrecy of the proceedings, and the limited exceptions to the secrecy
requirement); see Hughes, supra note 28, at 577 (describing the limitations on the use
of grand jury information).
56. See Hughes, supra note 28, at 611 n.149 (discussing Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e)(3)(b)). The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT
ACT) Act of 2001 changed this rule in certain circumstances. See infra note 111.
57. See Hughes, supra note 28, at 577, 633.
58. See 1 Beale et al., supra note 38, § 5.
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exonerated.59 While grand jury secrecy on its own may not wholly
address these concerns,60 the secrecy requirement arguably provides
important protection to witnesses compelled to testify or reveal
sensitive documents without the safeguards of an attorney, the
relevancy limits of trial, or the privilege against self-incrimination.6
Although critics debate the importance and efficacy of grand jury
secrecy in the larger context of criminal investigations,62 traditionally
the secrecy requirement is viewed as a recognition that the grand
jury's unparalleled investigatory powers can be justified only to help
the government reach the point of charging a suspect with a crime.63
Subpoena recipients can challenge the demand before complying
with it, but winning a motion to quash is extremely difficult. Under
Rule 17(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, grand jury
subpoenas cannot be "unreasonable or oppressive."'  However,
because grand jury investigations must be broad, grand jury
subpoenas bear a presumption of reasonableness. Considering a
motion to quash requires the court to balance the government's
interest in obtaining the information demanded and the burden of the
subpoena's demands on the recipient.66 Any challenger bears either
the difficult burden of proving that "there is no reasonable possibility
that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce
information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's
investigation," or that compliance with the subpoena would be
unreasonably burdensome.67 To slightly alleviate these seemingly
impossible burdens of proof, the subject of the grand jury's
investigation, usually covered by the secrecy requirement, can be
revealed to a subpoena's challenger.' However, because of the high
59. Douglas Oil, Co. v. Petrol Oil Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979);
see also Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy, supra note 39, at 352-53 (discussing Douglas
Oil).
60. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy, supra note 39, at 353 (arguing that these
concerns justify overall investigative secrecy, not just grand jury secrecy).
61. Id. at 354 (noting that the secrecy requirement protects grand jury witnesses
who may be more vulnerable to injury and so more deserving of protection because
they must testify without the protections available to witnesses in other
circumstances, such as at trial).
62. See Hughes, supra note 28, at 635-40; Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy, supra
note 39, at 352-56.
63. See Hughes, supra note 28, at 667-68. See generally Leipold, supra note 52, at
265-68 (discussing grand jury secrecy).
64. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(2); see 1 Beale et al., supra note 38, § 6:21, at 6-185
(discussing the reasonableness requirement for grand jury subpoenas).
65. 1 Beale et al., supra note 38, § 6:21, at 6-186 (citing United States v. R. Enters.,
Inc., 498 U.S. 292 (1991)).
66. See R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 300.
67. Id. at 301.
68. 1 Beale et al., supra note 38, § 6:21, at 6-186 (discussing R. Enters.). In a
sensitive investigation, the subject could be revealed to the court in camera so that the
judge could determine whether a motion to quash the subpoena had a reasonable
chance of success. Id.
2005] 2259
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burdens of proof imposed on a challenger, most grand jury subpoenas
will ultimately be enforced. Also, because an adverse ruling on a
motion to quash a subpoena is not an appealable final order, the
likelihood that a subpoena recipient will be able to avoid compliance
is further limited.69
B. Development of Administrative Agencies' Investigative Power
Information gathering tools for civil administrative agency
investigations developed differently from those used in criminal
investigations. Congress enables administrative agencies to enforce
their regulations by delegating subpoena power to them.7°
Administrative subpoenas can demand records and require witnesses
to testify about the records' accuracy.7 The Supreme Court construes
administrative agencies' subpoena power broadly-a civil subpoena
will be enforced so long as the "evidence sought... [is] not plainly
incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose."72 Like the grand
jury, an agency need not show probable cause to issue a subpoena; a
court must only find that "the inquiry is within the authority of the
agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is
reasonably relevant [to the inquiry]."73  Even subpoenas that are
"fishing expeditions" are valid so long as they seek to ensure
compliance with the agency's regulations.74
The Court's jurisprudence supports this broad subpoena authority
with three main justifications. First, broad administrative subpoena
power is necessary because it enables Congress to delegate power to
administrative agencies to investigate violations of federal law.75 In
this regard, administrative agency investigations serve the same
function as a grand jury investigation.76 Additionally, as with a grand
jury's subpoena,77 administrative subpoenas cannot be arbitrary and
69. See Hughes, supra note 28, at 595.
70. See Kenneth F. Warren, Administrative Law in the Political System 527 (4th
ed. 2004). Congress started to grant agencies these powers during the New Deal and
World War II, as the regulatory role of administrative agencies, and hence agencies'
need for information from regulated entities, expanded. See Kenneth Culp Davis &
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 4.1, at 138 (3d ed. 1994). For a
history of the development of administrative subpoena power, see Katherine Scherb,
Comment, Administrative Subpoenas for Private Financial Records: What Protection
for Privacy Does the Fourth Amendment Afford?, 1996 Wis. L. Rev 1075, 1076-85.
71. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 363 (1942) (recognizing that
administrative subpoena power can be used coercively).
72. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943); see also United
States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S.
48, 57 (1964).
73. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,642-43,652 (1950).
74. Hughes, supra note 28, at 588-89 (discussing the effects of Morton Salt).
75. Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 201 (1946).
76. Id. at 216.




the agency cannot act outside its statutory authority,7" but "this does
not mean that [the agency's] inquiry must be 'limited narrowly by ...
forecasts of the probable result of the investigation."'7 9 Instead, as in
a grand jury investigation, an agency issues an administrative
subpoena to "discover and procure evidence, not to prove a pending
charge."'8 Without subpoena power similar to that of a grand jury,
administrative agencies could not effectively investigate alleged
violations of the laws and regulations that the agency is charged with
enforcing.81
Second, broad administrative agency subpoena power does not
infringe upon Fourth Amendment privacy rights because the Court
treats civil and criminal cases differently for Fourth Amendment
purposes.2 Administrative agency subpoenas need only meet a
reasonableness standard, not a stricter probable cause standard, to
comply with the Fourth Amendment.83 This lower standard is
appropriate because, for many regulations, the only evidence of a
violation will exist in a company's records.84 As a result, if agencies
had to meet a strict probable cause standard to obtain access to such
records, agencies could not effectively enforce their regulations.85
In assessing an administrative subpoena's reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court uses a four-factor test: (1) whether the
investigation is conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose; (2)
whether the information requested by the subpoena is relevant to this
purpose; (3) whether the information sought is already within the
agency's possession; and (4) whether the agency followed all statutory
requirements in issuing the subpoena.86 The Court must make an
individualized inquiry into the context of the subpoena, because
factors like the relevancy of the requested information and the
adequacy or excess of the subpoena's breadth vary with the nature,
purpose, and scope of the issuing agency's inquiry.87 However, since
an administrative subpoena need not meet a stringent probable cause
78. Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 216.
79. Id. (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)).
80. Id. at 201.
81. See DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 7 & n.9.
82. See Warren, supra note 70, at 520; Ronald F. Wright, Note, The Civil and
Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93 Yale L.J. 1127, 1127 (1984).
83. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51 (1964). This was not always the
case. The Court originally demanded that agencies meet a probable cause standard
to demand records for regulatory purposes. See FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S.
298, 305-06 (1924) (condemning "fishing expeditions" in agency investigations). The
Court reversed this position in 1943, reflecting a recognition of administrative
agencies' growing social importance during the New Deal and World War II. See
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943).
84. See Ernest Gellhorn & Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Law and Process 130
(4th ed. 1997).
85. Id.
86. See Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58.
87. See Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
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standard to satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements against
unreasonable searches and seizures,88 the district court's review
focuses on "insur[ing] the integrity" of the agency's investigative
demands.89
Third, although agencies do not need probable cause to issue a
subpoena, judicial review prevents agencies from abusing their
subpoena power.9" Unlike a search warrant, which is issued without
prior notice and often executed with an unexpected physical
intrusion,9 an administrative subpoena "commences an adversar[ial]
process"'  that permits judicial review of the subpoena's
reasonableness before the subpoenaed party is punished for
noncompliance.93 If a subpoenaed party challenges the demand as an
unreasonable invasion of privacy rights, the district court must employ
the four-factor reasonableness test established in United States v.
Powell to evaluate the recipient's challenge.94  Additionally,
administrative agencies lack enforcement power-only federal courts,
and not the agencies themselves, can enforce administrative
subpoenas. In an administrative investigation, if a subpoenaed party
refuses to comply with the subpoena, the agency must go to a federal
district court for an order of enforcement.96 If the district court orders
the subpoena's enforcement but the recipient still refuses to comply,
the court can impose contempt sanctions. 7 However, judicial review
provides an important check on administrative agencies that prevents
88. See Powell, 379 U.S. at 51.
89. Wearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662, 665 (3d Cir. 1980).
90. DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 9; see also United States v. Sec. State Bank and
Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 1973).
91. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
92. United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000).
93. Id. (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1967)).
94. 379 U.S. 48 (1964); see United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53
(1950) (holding that the agency request must be reasonable). Even if the subpoena
meets the four-factor test's initial criteria to be enforceable, a recipient can challenge
a subpoena on other substantive grounds such as improper purpose, that the
subpoena demands privileged information, or that the subpoena infringes rights like
the free exercise of religion, freedom of association, and the privilege against self-
incrimination. See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); DOJ
Report, supra note 6, at 9.
95. Some statutes require the agency to request that the U.S. Attorney's office
seek enforcement of the subpoena in federal court instead of permitting the agency to
seek enforcement on its own. DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 9-10.
96. Id. at 9 & n.20. However, some agencies take other action to push the
subpoena recipients to "voluntarily" comply. See id. at 14. Additionally, some
statutes granting agencies' subpoena power require the agency to ask the United
States Attorney's office to seek enforcement. Id. at 9-10.
97. Id. at 11.
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the enforcement of overreaching and unreasonable investigative
demands.98
Several factors differentiate administrative subpoenas from
criminal investigatory tools. First, as discussed above, unlike search
warrants, administrative subpoenas do not require probable cause-
administrative subpoenas need only be reasonable to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment.99 Also, in contrast to a search warrant, an
administrative subpoena's compliance with the Fourth Amendment
can be litigated before any privacy intrusion occurs.' 0 Second, unlike
grand jury subpoena recipients, administrative subpoena recipients
receive extra protection from appellate review because a district
court's denial of a motion to quash or modify the subpoena is an
appealable final order.' Although most administrative subpoenas
will be enforced because the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard is difficult for a challenger to overcome, 102 this review
process is a vital source of administrative subpoenas' legitimacy. °3
Finally, administrative agency investigations are not subject to the
98. See United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000) ("As judicial
process is afforded before any intrusion occurs, the proposed intrusion is regulated
by, and its justification derives from, that process.").
99. Compare supra notes 13-37 and accompanying text, with supra notes 86-89
and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
101. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 330 (1940) (holding that parties
may immediately appeal district court orders enforcing these administrative
subpoenas because administrative subpoenas are "self-contained, so far as the
judiciary is concerned"); see Hughes, supra note 28, at 595. This stands in contrast to
the denial of a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena, which cannot be appealed as a
final order. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
102. Although much of the subpoenas' legitimacy comes from the judicial review
available to subpoenaed parties before they must comply with the demand, circuit
courts describe the standards of review as "minimal" and the Supreme Court declared
that, generally, courts must enforce an agency's subpoena unless the information
demanded is "'plainly... irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the [agency]."' Doe v.
Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 485 n.48 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943)).
103. Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 264 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that unlike a
search warrant, "the reasonableness of an administrative subpoena's command can be
contested in federal court before being enforced"); Bailey, 228 F.3d at 348. The
Bailey court pointed out that
[als judicial process is afforded before any intrusion occurs, the proposed
intrusion is regulated by, and its justification derives from, that process. In
short, the immediacy and intrusiveness of a search and seizure conducted
pursuant to a warrant demand the safeguard of demonstrating probable
cause to a neutral judicial officer before the warrant issues, whereas the
issuance of [an administrative] subpoena initiates an adversary process that
can command the production of documents and things only after judicial
process is afforded.
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strict secrecy requirements associated with grand jury proceedings.'
As a result, information obtained by an administrative subpoena can
be shared between government agencies."°5
C. Criminal and Civil Investigations Intersect
Although civil and criminal investigative processes developed
separately, in the context of administrative agency proceedings civil
and criminal investigations overlap with ever-increasing frequency." 6
Since Congress often provides for both civil and criminal penalties for
breaches of federal agencies' regulations,'0 7 to enforce its regulations
an agency can often choose either to pursue civil penalties and
administrative sanctions or recommend the case to the Department of
Justice for prosecution. 10 8 One regulatory breach can, however, lead
to parallel civil and criminal investigations and legal processes. 109
Because of this, the extent to which civil and criminal investigators
can share findings becomes relevant. Grand jury subpoenas and
administrative subpoenas both can demand a broad range of
information.110 However, information sharing between simultaneous
administrative agency and grand jury investigations would necessarily
be unbalanced, because while information obtained by an
administrative subpoena could be shared with prosecutors and used in
a criminal investigation, grand jury secrecy would prevent information
from moving in the other direction."' This means that the
104. See Hughes, supra note 28, at 600-01 (noting that the information obtained by
administrative subpoenas is to some degree confidential but is not subject to the strict
secrecy requirement for grand jury subpoenas).
105. See id. (noting that unlike "the formidable barriers erected to prevent the
disclosure of grand jury information," information obtained by administrative
subpoenas can be "disclos[ed] in the public interest and without the necessity for a
court order").
106. Id. at 578-80.
107. Id.; see Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 Yale L.J. 1795, 1801-02 (1992).
108. Hughes, supra note 28, at 578-89.
109. Id. at 586. Hughes also points out that a civil remedy may be more attractive
because the burden of proof in civil proceedings is lower, discovery rules are more
favorable, and the party may submit to a penalty rather than contest a criminal
charge. Id. at 579.
110. See supra Part I.A.
111. See Hughes, supra note 28, at 593-94, 600-01. However, the PATRIOT Act
further blurred the line between civil and criminal processes by creating an exception
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which establishes grand jury secrecy.
Under section 203 of the PATRIOT Act, prosecutors can disclose grand jury
information involving foreign intelligence or counter-intelligence information to any
federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or
national security official. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT
ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203(a), 115 Stat. 272, 278-80 (2001) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). For a thorough discussion of the
PATRIOT Act's changes to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), see Jennifer M.
Collins, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Sharing Grand Jury Information with
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information obtained by an agency's civil subpoenas could end up in a
prosecutor's office as the basis for a criminal prosecution-an
agency's broad subpoena power could wholly undercut the grand
jury's traditional function with fewer strings attached for
prosecutors. 12  Since agency investigations are not subject to the
secrecy requirement for grand jury investigations, and because
administrative subpoenas do not require probable cause, the extent to
which prosecutors can use the information gathered by an
administrative subpoena carries serious implications for the privacy
rights of individuals under investigation.
1. Using Civil Subpoenas for Criminal Law Enforcement Purposes:
Section 248 of HIPAA
n3
In 1996, as part of HIPAA, Congress further entangled civil and
criminal investigatory processes by granting the Attorney General the
power to issue administrative subpoenas for use by the FBI in federal
health care fraud investigations." 4 This bill marked the first time that
Congress granted this broad investigative subpoena power solely for
criminal law enforcement purposes."' Rising federal health care costs
were a primary public concern at the time of the bill's enactment, and
Congress found Medicare fraud to be a substantial part of the
problem.1 6 Consequently, in response to mounting public pressure to
reduce these costs, Congress targeted Medicare fraud.'17 Congress
granted the Attorney General administrative subpoena power for use
in FBI fraud investigations that could obtain "any records or other
things relevant to the [health care fraud] investigation. 118 These
administrative subpoenas are identical to those of civil regulatory
agencies, including their permissible scope, their enforcement through
federal courts, the reasonableness standard federal courts must use in
reviewing them, and the treatment of a motion to quash as an
the Intelligence Community Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
1261 (2002).
112. Hughes, supra note 28, at 594.
113. HIPAA § 248 is codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (2000).
114. HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 248, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3486).
115. Unlike civil regulatory agencies with enforcement power-such as the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") or the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")-the
FBI is purely a law enforcement and domestic intelligence gathering institution. The
FBI has no regulatory function at all; instead, the FBI builds criminal cases for federal
prosecutors. The FBI agents and federal prosecutors working on a particular matter
freely share all information relevant to the case. See Todd Masse & William Krouse,
Congressional Reearch Serv., The FBI: Past, Present, and Future 14-17, 37 (Oct. 2,
2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32095.pdf.
116. DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 31.
117. See id.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a)(1)(a)(i).
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appealable final order.'19 The two federal circuits that have faced
challenges to administrative subpoenas under the statute upheld the
subpoenas as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without
questioning the statute's validity. 120 As a result, this statute, with the
blessing of the federal courts, enables the FBI to investigate health
care fraud subject to the less strict Fourth Amendment standards for
civil - not criminal - investigations.
2. The Federal Circuit Court Rulings on Section 248 of HIPAA
In United States v. Bailey,12' the Fourth Circuit became the first
federal appellate court to address the validity of an administrative
subpoena issued under Section 248 of HIPAA. In Bailey, a doctor
challenged four administrative subpoenas he received from the
United States Attorney for the Western District of Virginia to
investigate alleged insurance fraud. 22 The doctor argued that since he
was the target of a criminal investigation, the Fourth Amendment
required that the government demonstrate probable cause against
him before demanding his records. 123 It would be unconstitutional,
the doctor asserted, if the government could evade the Fourth
Amendment probable cause requirement simply by issuing a
subpoena instead of seeking a search warrant. 124  However, without
119. See DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 31-32. In this report, the Department of
Justice recognized that these subpoenas permit investigators to obtain information
that could have been obtained by grand jury subpoena, but the administrative
subpoena avoids any delay and bypasses secrecy rules, making it a useful and flexible
tool for these investigations. Id. at 35. In 2001, United States Attorneys' offices
issued 2102 subpoenas under this statute. Id. at 34.
120. See Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bailey,
228 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2000).
121. 228 F.3d at 341.
122. Id. at 343-44. Each of the four subpoenas required the doctor to produce the
following documents from the period between January 1992 and April 29, 1999:
1. All patient records and documentation concerning patients whose
services were billed to [various insurance carriers], including
complete medical files, patient appointment books, patient billing
records, office sign-in sheets, and telephone messages in any form.
2. All purchase records and invoices reflecting.., controlled
substance purchases, DEA Official Order Forms, records of
inventories, dispensing records ....
3. All original accounting and bank records, general ledgers, patient
information/insurance cards, cash receipt and disbursement
records, business ownership records and other items identifying
sources of income from billings. ...
4. All documents regarding health care plans' requirements for claim
filing and record retention ....
5. All records of any controlled substance samples provided ....
Id. at 344.
123. Opening Brief of Appellant at 11-12, Bailey, 228 F.3d at 341 (No. 99-4870).
124. Bailey, 228 F.3d at 346. The doctor also challenged the subpoenas as
unreasonable, overly broad, and in violation of his patients' doctor-patient privilege.
See id. at 345.
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addressing whether Congress could constitutionally permit the use of
a lesser Fourth Amendment standard- reasonableness instead of
probable cause-in criminal investigations, the court enforced the
subpoenas. 125 As a consequence, the court set an important precedent
allowing the government to use private information obtained without
probable cause as the basis for a criminal prosecution.126
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit soon followed the
Bailey court's lead. In Doe v. United States, the court also upheld
administrative subpoenas issued to a podiatrist under Section 248 of
HIPAA to investigate criminal fraud allegations.' The Doe court
also rejected the petitioner's arguments that subpoenas under Section
248 of HIPAA violated the Fourth Amendment by giving agents and
prosecutors access to private information without probable cause. 28
To support its conclusions, the Doe court reasoned that on-premises
searches and inspections, including those conducted by administrative
agencies, require probable cause, but because "[tihe immediacy and
intrusiveness associated with a search are not present in [a] document
request.., the heightened requirement of probable cause is
inapplicable" to any administrative subpoena.2 9 The court did not
differentiate between administrative subpoenas issued for civil rather
than criminal purposes, merely noting that Congress granted the
Department of Justice administrative subpoena power for use in
health care fraud investigations without questioning the statute's
validity. 3 ° As a result, the Doe court reinforced the Fourth Circuit's
holding that administrative subpoenas could be used for purely
criminal law enforcement purposes without any Fourth Amendment
violation.'
125. See id. at 346-49. The court refused to distinguish the functions of civil
administrative subpoenas and grand jury subpoenas. Id. at 346-47 (citing United States
v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950), a case addressing the validity of purely civil
administrative subpoenas, to support upholding the use of administrative subpoenas
in a criminal investigation).
126. See id. at 347-48 ("While the Fourth Amendment protects people 'against
unreasonable searches and seizures,' it imposes a probable cause requirement only on
the issuance of warrants .... Thus, unless subpoenas are warrants, they are limited
by the general reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment... , not by the
probable cause requirement.").
127. Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 2001).
128. See id. at 265.
129. Id. at 264.
130. Id. at 265.
131. Id. ("Both the Supreme Court and this circuit have long applied [the
reasonableness] test when reviewing administrative subpoena requests, and we see no
convincing basis upon which to distinguish these binding precedents simply because
this subpoena was issued pursuant to a criminal, as opposed to civil, investigation.").
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3. Congressional Limitations on Administrative Subpoena Power
Under HIPAA
Although the statute and the case law may have undermined the
Fourth Amendment rights of health care professionals under
investigation for fraud, Congress did place an important limitation on
administrative subpoena power in Section 248 of HIPAA to protect
patients' privacy rights. The statute provides that a health care
provider's subpoenaed records can only be used to investigate a
violation of health care fraud laws. 132 Since health care is a highly
regulated area in which detailed record keeping is often required by
statute, administrative subpoena power over these records gives the
FBI access to patients' private medical information as well as doctors'
business and financial records. 33  However, the statute explicitly
prohibits the FBI from using any patient's information in any other
investigation unrelated to health care fraud.3 4 While the statute gives
the FBI access to many individuals' sensitive health care records, the
FBI is strictly limited in its future use of this information for other
investigations.
4. Informal Limitations on HIPAA Administrative Subpoena Power
The extent to which the Attorney General has delegated this
subpoena power also presents a less formal check on the FBI's
investigations. As permitted by the statute, the Attorney General
delegated administrative subpoena power to all United States
Attorneys and the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division, who in turn delegated this authority to all Assistant United
States Attorneys. 135  The Attorney General, however, has not
delegated this power to the Director of the FBI, which the statute
would also allow.'36  Because of this, FBI agents investigating
Medicare fraud must rely on a federal prosecutor to issue a subpoena
for the investigation.'37 While agents and prosecutors work closely
together, a prosecutor usually holds gatekeeping power over coercive
processes, like grand jury subpoenas, that an agent may need to build
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3486(e)(1) (2000).
133. See DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 35 (noting that the FBI has used these
subpoenas to obtain records and documents from "hospitals, nursing homes and
individual practitioners, including medical records, billing records, and cost reports").
134. 18 U.S.C. § 3486(e)(1)-(2). The United States Attorney's Manual specifically
instructs prosecutors, who issue the HIPAA subpoenas, about the limitations on the
future use of information obtained with the subpoenas. See Dept. of Justice, United
States Attorney's Manual, 28 C.F.R. § 9-44.202[5] (2005).
135. See DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 34. In contrast, Congress has authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury limited and non-delegable power to issue administrative
subpoenas in cases where the Director of the Secret Service determines that there is
an imminent threat against a Secret Service protectee. Id. at 38.




a case. 38  Since the Attorney General has not delegated
administrative subpoena power to the FBI directly, United States
Attorneys also end up in this gatekeeping position in Medicare fraud
investigations conducted under Section 248 of HIPAA1 39  How
frequently a prosecutor in the health care fraud context denies an
agent's request for a subpoena undoubtedly varies, 140 but total
deference to agents' requests is unlikely because prosecutors' and FBI
agents' interests are not entirely aligned.14 Because prosecutors seek
to "build[] a professional reputation for legal acuity," they are risk
averse and may not be willing to authorize an investigation that could
be unsuccessful. 142 Judicial review of subpoenas heightens this risk
aversion, because prosecutors encounter "'asymmetric
accountability"'-that is, they are "more likely to face review and
condemnation for authorizing action than for vetoing it.' 143 Since
prosecutors' and agents' interests in utilizing coercive processes can
be incongruous, FBI agents' reliance on prosecutors to issue
administrative subpoenas puts at least a small check on how and when
agents actually use the subpoenas in investigations.
D. Administrative Subpoena Power and Terrorism Investigations
The Attorney General has successfully used administrative
subpoena power to target Medicare fraud.'" The subpoenas'
effectiveness in the health care fraud context raises the question of
whether Congress should grant the Attorney General-or the FBI-
138. Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors,
103 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 779-80 (2003) [hereinafter Richman, Prosecutors and Their
Agents] (discussing prosecutorial controls of investigatory tools).
139. DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 34 (agents must rely on prosecutors to obtain
Medicare fraud subpoenas). When Congress passed § 3486, the Attorney General
recognized that Congress did not intend to give the FBI unlimited administrative
subpoena power, and in anticipation of strict congressional oversight, the Attorney
General self-imposed strict recordkeeping to track the use of the administrative
subpoenas under § 3486. See Dept. of Justice, United States Attorney's Manual, 28
C.F.R. §§ 9-44.200 to 9-44.204.
140. Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, supra note 138, at 793 (discussing
variations in prosecutor-agent relationships).
141. See id. at 778-87 (discussing prosecutorial controls of investigatory tools).
142. Id. at 784 (discussing prosecutorial controls of investigatory tools).
143. Id. at 785-86.
144. DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 35. The DOJ report found that
[if] the statutory authority provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3486 [were] revoked, the
use of a grand jury subpoena to obtain the same documents would decrease
the opportunity to share information because of the protective provisions of
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e). Loss of this information sharing capacity would
hamper the efforts of the Attorney General to fulfill Congress' intent in
providing the authority in HIPAA-to facilitate enforcement of federal
statutes related to health care fraud and abuse and thereby improve the
"availability and affordability of health insurance in the United States."
Id. In 2001, United States Attorneys issued 2102 administrative subpoenas for health
care fraud investigations. Id. at 40.
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additional administrative subpoena power for other types of criminal
investigations.'45 The on-going national debate as to how the federal
government can best fight terrorism now frames the question of
whether the FBI should be given administrative subpoena power.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress became
extremely concerned with the FBI's ability to effectively combat
terrorism, especially in terms of gathering and coordinating domestic
intelligence to prevent another attack. 46  Without fundamental
reforms to the FBI's structure and operations, the FBI could not
effectively prevent future terrorist attacks.
147
The USA PATRIOT Act,1 48 passed only six weeks after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, gave the Attorney General enhanced and
widely delegable investigatory powers. 149  Section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act, for example, enables government agents investigating
international terrorism to bypass the Fourth Amendment's search
warrant requirement. 150 However, the PATRIOT Act did not provide
the FBI with similarly broad powers for domestic terrorism
145. See Updating the Law, supra note 7.
146. See generally 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (2004) [hereinafter 9/11
Commission Report], available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/; U.S. Senate Select
Comm. on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence,
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001 (December 2002) [hereinafter Joint Inquiry]
(discussing factual findings and systemic weaknesses in the intelligence community
leading up to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html.
147. FBI Intelligence Reform, supra note 8, at 1-2. Two problems with the FBI's
tradition and structure became immediately apparent. First, the FBI has "long
favored its criminal justice mission over its national security mission." 9/11
Commission Report, supra note 146, at 423. As a consequence, FBI counter-
terrorism programs lacked critical resources. See Joint Inquiry, supra note 146, at 336-
45. Second, in response to domestic intelligence scandals in the 1960s,
communication "walls" within the FBI separated criminal and intelligence
investigations. FBI Intelligence Reform, supra note 8, at 14-15, 48. The FBI
continues to work to refocus its resources and operations to be better equipped to
prevent future terrorist attacks. Id. at 4-15.
148. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (to be codified at scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
149. Richard C. Leone, The Quiet Republic: The Missing Debate About Civil
Liberties After 9/11, in The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in an Age of
Terrorism 2, 7 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003).
150. See David Cole & James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution:
Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security 166 (2002) [hereinafter
Terrorism and the Constitution]. Without making any showing of probable cause, if a
government agent self-certifies that sensitive information in the form of "'any
tangible things"' is sought for an international terrorism investigation, a judge from
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court can issue an order granting the agents
access to the sought information. Id.; see § 215, 115 Stat. at 287-88.
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investigations.151 In an effort to equip the FBI with the necessary
tools for effective counter-terrorism operations, bills proposed in the
House and Senate would give the Attorney General unlimited
administrative subpoena power for all terrorism investigations. 152 Part
II explains these proposals to grant the FBI administrative subpoena
power for terrorism investigations, as well as the Fourth Amendment
implications of these proposals.
II. SHOULD THE FBI BE GRANTED ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA
POWER FOR TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS?
President Bush, the Justice Department, and individual
Congressmen and Senators have all pushed Congress to grant
administrative subpoena power to the FBI for terrorism
investigations. Proponents argue that the FBI should have the power
to obtain on demand any documents or "tangible things" related to a
domestic terrorism investigation.153  Two bills to authorize
administrative subpoena power for terrorism investigations have
already been proposed in both houses of Congress.' The proposals
would allow the FBI to issue its own subpoenas.155 Subpoenaed
parties that comply with the demand would be granted immunity from
any resulting civil liability.'56 In circumstances where the Attorney
General self-certifies that disclosure would endanger national
security, subpoena recipients would be barred from disclosing to
anyone, except legal counsel, that the subpoena was issued.'57 These
bills immediately sparked heated debates in the House and Senate
Judiciary Committee hearings.
The debate over whether administrative subpoena power should be
given to the FBI for terrorism investigations raises three important
questions. First, and most importantly, can this power be granted
without undermining Fourth Amendment safeguards against
unreasonable searches and seizures? Second, if Congress does give
the FBI administrative subpoena power, what limitations, if any,
should be imposed upon the FBI in using the power? Finally, on a
practical level, would administrative subpoenas provide investigators
151. See Updating the Law, supra note 7.
152. See S. 2555, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 3037, 108th Cong. (2003).
153. See H.R. 3037.
154. S. 2555; H.R. 3037.
155. S. 2555; H.R. 3037. Although these bills name the Attorney General as the
issuing authority, nothing in the bills would prevent the Attorney General from
delegating this power to the FBI.
156. S. 2555; H.R. 3037. Senator Kyl, who proposed the Senate's version of the
bill, explained that the bill would shield third-party subpoena recipients such as
businesses from liability for breaching privacy agreements with customers in order to
comply with the FBI's demand. 150 Cong. Rec. S7178 (daily ed. June 22, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Kyl to introduce S. 2555).




with too much information to be useful as an effective investigatory
tool? Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C examine these questions in turn.
A. Administrative Subpoena Power, Terrorism Investigations, and
Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights
Although giving the FBI administrative subpoena power for
terrorism investigations would be an unprecedented grant of power,
supporters argue that Fourth Amendment rights would not be
infringed.'58 According to the federal appellate courts that have
examined the use of administrative subpoenas in criminal health care
fraud investigations, the subpoenas do not violate the Fourth
Amendment.159 Administrative subpoena power could not be abused
by investigators because the subpoenas would be subject to judicial
review and could only be enforced by a federal court.1" As with all
administrative subpoenas, any subpoenaed party could bring a
challenge to the demand in federal court, 161 subject to the Powell
reasonableness test,162 and a denial of a motion to quash would be
immediately appealable as a final order.163  Since judicial review
would ensure that only the reasonable subpoenas are enforced, use of
the subpoenas would not violate Fourth Amendment rights."64 Critics
respond to these proposals with two concerns.
1. Concerns About Probable Cause Versus Reasonableness
First, as in the health care context, administrative subpoenas for
terrorism investigations would permit the government to use private
information obtained without probable cause in a criminal
investigation. 165 However, differences between health care fraud and
terrorism indicate that while a relaxed Fourth Amendment standard
158. See Tools to Fight Terrorism: Subpoena Authority and Pretrial Detention of
Terrorists: Hearing Before the United States Senate Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on
Terrorism, Tech. and Homeland Sec., 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Brand
Testimony] (testimony of Rachel Brand, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Policy, United States Department of Justice), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1235; 150 Cong. Rec. S7178-79 (daily ed.
June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl regarding S. 2555).
159. See Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding
administrative subpoena power for health care fraud investigation); United States v.
Bailey, 228 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2000) (same).
160. Brand Testimony, supra note 158.
161. 150 Cong. Rec. S7179 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl
explaining the provisions of S. 2555).
162. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
164. 150 Cong. Rec. S7179 (daily ed. June 22, 2004).
165. For examples of the use of administrative subpoenas in the context of health
care fraud, see Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 2001), and United States v.




may be appropriate for health care investigations, this may not be the
case for terrorism investigations. A health care fraud investigation is
similar to a regulatory agency investigation because, since the
evidence of wrongdoing only exists in a provider's business and
financial records, a probable cause requirement would impede an
effective investigation. 66 A terrorism investigation, however, could
be pursued by using many tactics; useful information could likely
come from many sources, not just one determinate set of business
records. 67 As a result, applying a relaxed Fourth Amendment
standard to terrorism investigations may not always be necessary.
However, applying this relaxed standard to all terrorism investigations
would enable the FBI to evade Fourth Amendment probable cause
requirements to access suspects' private information in a wide range
of circumstances.
Adding to the gravity of this Fourth Amendment problem, critics
note that terrorism administrative subpoenas would give the FBI
access to an unprecedented amount of private information without
probable cause.1" Administrative subpoenas provide investigators
166. See Gellhorn & Levin, supra note 84, at 130; see also supra text accompanying
note 84.
167. See generally Joint Inquiry, supra note 146 (detailing the many different types
of operations and strategies necessary to gather information to fully investigate
suspected terrorists).
168. The closest Congress has come to granting the FBI such broad power is in
section 218 of the PATRIOT Act, which permits the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA") courts to issue warrants for surveillance without probable
cause if foreign intelligence gathering is "a significant purpose" of the surveillance.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001) (to be codified at scattered sections of the U.S.C.);
see Charles Doyle, Congressional Research Serv., The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal
Analysis 9 (Apr. 15, 2002), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/10092.pdf. Congress established the
FISA courts in 1978, but before the PATRIOT Act, FISA warrants required
certification that "the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence
information." 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000) (amended 2001); see Doyle, supra, at
8. The PATRIOT Act amendment enables government agents to use the information
obtained with a FISA warrant for domestic criminal law enforcement purposes by
eliminating the barriers between criminal investigations and foreign intelligence
operations that developed out of court rulings and the Justice Department's
interpretation of FISA requirements. See 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 146, at
78-80. Although "[f]acilitating closer cooperation between criminal investigators and
foreign intelligence collectors is probably not a controversial intention in itself,"
critics take issue with section 218 because it allows government agents to obtain
warrants to conduct surveillance that could ultimately be used in a criminal
prosecution without a showing of probable cause. Reg Whitaker, After 9/11: A
Surveillance State?, in Lost Liberties: Ashcroft and the Assault on Personal Freedom
52, 59-61 (Cynthia Brown ed., 2003). Critics view this as an end-run around the
Fourth Amendment requirements for gathering information that will be used in a
criminal prosecution. See Nancy Chang, Silencing Political Dissent 55-59 (2002).
However, at the present, this power is still tied to foreign intelligence information and
no similar power exists for gathering domestic intelligence; additionally, because of
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with access to all information "relevant to" the investigation.'69 But
because of the differences between Medicare fraud and terrorism,
administrative subpoenas in the terrorism context would give the FBI
access to significantly more information. 7 ' Since Congress defined
health care fraud narrowly, the range of documents "relevant to" the
crime is limited to the provider's professional, business, and financial
records. 7' However, as the September 11, 2001 attacks unfortunately
demonstrated, and as the federal international terrorism statute
reflects,17 2 the range of information that could be "related to" terrorist
activities is infinitely broad - anything from flight school enrollment
to rental car reservations. Administrative subpoena power could be
an effective investigatory tool for the FBI because it would provide
broad access to private information, but the information would come
at the cost of individuals' Fourth Amendment privacy rights in many
different contexts.
173
the controversial nature of section 218, it is one of the PATRIOT Act provisions that
will "sunset" on December 31, 2005 without further action from Congress. See Doyle,
supra, at 10, 13-14.
169. 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a)(1)(B)(i) (2000); see also Doe, 253 F.3d at 266 (upholding
as reasonable a health care fraud administrative subpoena because the proper scope
of an administrative subpoena is "'evidence... [that is] not plainly incompetent or
irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the [agency] in the discharge of [its] duties'
(quoting Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943)).
170. Under HIPAA, federal health care fraud is limited to knowingly and willfully
(1) defrauding any health care benefit program by means of false representations; (2)
making false statements regarding a health care benefit program; (3) embezzling,
converting, or stealing any funds, property, or assets of a health care benefit program;
or (4) obstructing, delaying, preventing, or misleading federal health care fraud
investigators. See Jonathan Cone et al., Health Care Fraud, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
713, 749-50 (2003). In comparison, the federal statute defining international
terrorism, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b, is much broader and covers many different types of
activities.
171. See Doe, 253 F.3d at 259-61; United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 344 (4th
Cir. 2000). The Doe court upheld the reasonableness of a Medicare administrative
subpoena that requested the defendant-podiatrist's health care related bank and
financial records, tax returns, documents and files regarding patient referrals,
academic transcripts from all medical training, all documents concerning ethics,
professional responsibility, and medical-billing issues within podiatrist's possession,
and all professional publications received by the podiatrist. Doe, 253 F.3d at 259-61.
The Bailey court upheld the reasonableness of a Medicare administrative subpoena
that requested the defendant-doctor's patient records where the doctor's services
were billed to specified health insurances companies, purchase records and invoices
reflecting controlled substance purchases, accounting and bank records, documents
regarding health care plans' requirements for claim filing, and records of samples of
controlled substances received from drug companies. Bailey, 228 F.3d at 344.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b.
173. As Senator Patrick Leahy pointed out in a Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing regarding the use of administrative subpoenas in terrorism investigations,
"[t]here are a handful of administrative subpoena powers that are in the criminal
code. Because criminal proceedings are unique, and the ability to do harm to the
target of a criminal investigation simply for being investigated is great, these existing
powers are carefully crafted, limited and statute specific." Tools to Fight Terrorism:
Subpoena Authority and Pretrial Detention of Terrorists: Hearing Before the United
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2. Concerns About the Effectiveness of Judicial Review
Second, critics argue, in practice, judicial safeguards would not
protect individuals' privacy from unreasonable terrorism
administrative subpoenas. 174 Even if a reasonableness standard would
not violate the Fourth Amendment, judicial review would not weed
out unreasonable subpoenas because recipients have no incentive to
challenge the demands.175  To challenge a subpoena, the recipient
faces a high burden of proof to prevail and must bear all litigation
costs.176  While this alone is not significant, as courts accept
administrative subpoenas as legitimate in other contexts despite these
conditions, 77 using these subpoenas in terrorism investigations would
be subtly-but critically-different. When the FBI subpoenas a
health care provider's records in a Medicare fraud investigation, that
health care provider is under investigation.1 7s However, if the FBI
were to subpoena an internet service provider's business records for a
terrorism investigation, the investigation would likely be focused on
one of the company's clients, not the company itself. 79 The internet
service provider would be a third party, not under investigation, and
would be shielded from all civil liability, 8 ' including lawsuits for
violating privacy agreements with customers.'81  Further, the
customers themselves, even if alerted to the demand, do not have
standing to challenge the demand. 8 ' While the subpoenaed health
care provider would have an incentive-the provider's own future
criminal liability-to bear the costs and the high risk of losing a
motion to quash the subpoena, a third party insulated from liability
has no similarly compelling reason to resist compliance with even
unreasonable subpoenas.'83 In the context of terrorism investigations,
States Senate Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Leahy Testimony]
(statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, ranking Democratic member of the United
States Senate Judiciary Committee), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1235.
174. See Tools to Fight Terrorism: Subpoena Authority and Pretrial Detention of
Terrorists: Hearing Before the United States Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Robinson Testimony] (testimony of James Robinson,
Former Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, 1998-
2001), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1235.
175. Id.
176. Id.; see supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
178. Ctr. for Democracy & Technology, Administrative Subpoenas for the FBI: A




180. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
181. See Unchecked Power, supra note 178.
182. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
183. See Unchecked Power, supra note 178. As Professor Orin Kerr points out, the
cost to a third party, such as an internet service provider, of providing information to
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because third party subpoena recipients have no incentive to
challenge the FBI's demands, judicial review cannot actually protect
the privacy rights of individuals under investigation.' 84
Also, even if subpoenaed parties did have an incentive to resist
compliance, they may not know that they could challenge the
demand. In the context of Medicare fraud, since health care providers
are sophisticated parties and the field is highly regulated, providers
likely know their rights under HIPAA. 115 In contrast, since the range
of businesses that may possess information about an individual
targeted by an FBI terrorism investigation is limitless, there is no
similar guarantee in this context that a subpoena recipient will be a
sophisticated party.'86 When faced with a demand from the FBI,
especially if the subpoena mandates complete secrecy, a party may
not know that the demand could be challenged in court. Again, in the
terrorism context, the availability of judicial review may not work to
weed out unreasonable subpoenas and protect individuals' privacy
rights.
Reatedly, subpoena recipients unsure of their rights could be too
intimidated to resist the FBI's demand. In a different context, the
Supreme Court held that if an agency's official demand for
cooperation with government authorities implies that noncompliance
is not an option, the technical legality of noncompliance is, on its own,
an inadequate safeguard of individuals' rights to challenge the
demand.187 In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the Court examined a
Rhode Island state legislative provision that established a commission
respond to a government subpoena often decreases as the amount of information
demanded increases. Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure,
105 Colum. L. Rev 279, 293-94 (2005). This speaks to both the incentive of a third-
party subpoena recipient to challenge a demand as unreasonable and the
toothlessness of the Powell "burdensomeness" factor in assessing a subpoena's
reasonableness. See id. Professor Kerr further argues that traditional criminal
procedures do not translate to adequately protect privacy rights in criminal
investigations and prosecutions that use digital evidence, and he proposes a higher
legal threshold to compel disclosure of such evidence. Id. at 294, 309.
184. See Unchecked Power, supra note 178.
185. Id.
186. Cf Terrorism and the Constitution, supra note 150, at 159 (arguing that post-
September 11, 2001 changes to laws governing surveillance and information-gathering
will likely target Arab and Muslim immigrants); David Cole, The Course of Least
Resistance: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, in Lost Liberties: Ashcroft and
the Assault on Personal Freedom, supra note 168, at 13, 30-31 (arguing that, as in past
times of threat, including both World Wars, the Cold War, and Vietnam, post-
September 11, 2001 security measures enable the government to target a vulnerable
minority, namely Arab and Muslim foreign nationals); Christopher Edley Jr., The
New American Dilemma: Racial Profiling Post-9/11, in The War on Our Freedoms:
Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, supra note 149, at 170, 185 (arguing that post-
September 11, 2001 government surveillance will likely disproportionately target
Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians, sweeping many private individuals into the
government's net of suspicion).
187. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 68-69 (1963).
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to prevent the sale of obscene publications to minors.188 As part of its
duties, the commission would, on official stationery, notify book
distributors that the commission had deemed some of the distributor's
materials obscene, thank the recipient in advance for cooperating with
authorities to prevent sale of the materials to minors, remind the
recipient that the commission's duty was to recommend prosecution
upon discovering such sales, and mention that the commission's lists
of objectionable materials would be circulated to local police
departments. 189 The Court held that although a distributor's "refusal
to 'cooperate' [with a letter from the commission] would have
violated no law. ... , [p]eople do not lightly disregard public officers'
thinly veiled threats to institute criminal proceedings against them if
they do not come around [and comply with the demand]."'190 An FBI
administrative subpoena in a terrorism investigation could have a
similar effect on recipients. A subpoenaed party may comply out of
fear of repercussions for noncompliance, whether or not the recipient
knew that the demand could be challenged. If intimidated subpoena
recipients will not challenge potentially unreasonable subpoenas, the
judicial review safeguard would be further undermined.
B. What Limitations, if Any, Should Be Placed on the FBI's Use of
Information Obtained by Administrative Subpoenas?
If Congress grants administrative subpoena power to the FBI for
terrorism investigations, the question then becomes how, if at all,
Congress should limit the power. Advocates in favor of granting the
FBI terrorism subpoena power regularly cite the effectiveness of
administrative subpoenas in investigating and prosecuting Medicare
fraud to justify using the power in a wide range of terrorism
investigations.191 Critics, however, point out that Congress subjected
Medicare fraud subpoena power to strict limitations to protect the
privacy of patients uninvolved in the fraud.192 In the terrorism
context, without clearly defined boundaries, critics argue,
administrative subpoena power would give the FBI extraordinary
power that could be too easily abused or overused.'93 In its report, the
9/11 Commission stated that in considering the future tools necessary
to fight terrorism, in light of concerns for civil liberties, "[i]f [an
executive branch] power is granted, there must be adequate
188. Id. at 59.
189. Id. at 62-63.
190. Id. at 68.
191. See Updating the Law, supra note 7.
192. See Unchecked Power, supra note 178.
193. See A Review of Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Proposals, Including the
USA PATRIOT Act and the SAFE Act: Hearing Before the United States Senate
Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Bob Barr, Former Member of




guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use." '194 Using the 9/11
Commission's recommendation as a starting point, and drawing upon
the FBI's experience with Medicare fraud administrative subpoenas,
two questions arise regarding the necessary limits on FBI subpoena
power.
1. Governmental Use of Information Accessed Through
Administrative Subpoenas
The usefulness of the information obtained by an administrative
subpoena would be different in a health care investigation and in a
terrorism investigation. An administrative subpoena is useful to
Medicare fraud investigators because it provides access to a
determinative set of documents: the health care provider's business
and financial records. 195 After an investigation ends, however, the
statute requires that the seized records cannot be used further unless
they reveal evidence of additional Medicare fraud. 196 In the health
care context, Congress outlawed using any confidential information
accessed by administrative subpoenas in a larger criminal
investigation because such an investigation would compromise the
privacy rights of patients not implicated in the fraud.197
In the terrorism context, however, the vast amounts of information
obtained by administrative subpoenas would likely be used for data
mining.' 9 Objectively, data mining presents terrorism investigators
with a useful tool because it picks out significant patterns in huge
quantities of information. 199 Data mining enables investigators to
"connect the dots" between seemingly insignificant events."1° In the
months leading up to September 11, 2001, the FBI failed to notice and
connect significant pieces of information that could have uncovered
the terrorist plot,201 in part because of insufficient information
analysis. 22 As Mary DeRosa points out in her report on data mining
for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, basic data
194. 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 146, at 394-95.
195. See supra notes 166, 171 and accompanying text.
196. 18 U.S.C. § 3486(e)(1) (2000); see A. Craig Eddy, The Effect of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) on Health Care Fraud
in Montana, 61 Mont. L. Rev. 175, 202 (2000) (explaining the investigatory subpoena
power granted to federal health care fraud investigators under HIPAA).
197. See DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 33.
198. See Mary DeRosa, Ctr. for Strategic and Int'l Studies, Data Mining and Data
Analysis for Counterterrorism 14 (2004) (noting that although data mining on its own
does not give the government greater access to private information, data mining
techniques employed for counterterrorism purposes would be applied to data within
the government's possession), available at
http://www.csis.org/tech/2004_counterterrorism.pdf.
199. Id. at 3.
200. Id. at 13.
201. Joint Inquiry, supra note 146, at 10-33.
202. Id. at 59, 336-39.
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mining using government watch list information, airline reservation
records, and aggregated publicly available data would have linked
together and identified all nineteen of the September 11, 2001
hijackers. 23  Because of the growing importance of subtle and
superficially unconnected pieces of information, computer-based data
mining could provide valuable assistance to investigators faced with
large quantities of potentially relevant information.
Additionally, as Professor Philip Heymann points out, as the FBI
shifts its focus from ex-post criminal investigations to ex-ante
terrorism investigations, the FBI must also recognize that terrorism
prevention requires a much more complete set of information than is
necessary to solve a crime after the fact.04 Investigation of a crime
after it occurs can take years, and the crime scene itself can often
provide valuable leads.25 Counter-terrorism investigators working to
prevent an attack, however, must tackle the much more difficult task
of finding "traces of a plan, [as opposed to] traces of a completed
event" under the pressure of a serious deadline. 26  Additionally,
although convicting most of the perpetrators of a successful crime
could be considered a success, "locking up less than a critical mass of
a group planning a future crime has to be considered a failure. '"207
Since terrorism investigators must find patterns in huge quantities of
data,20 8 data mining of information obtained through administrative
subpoenas could significantly boost the success of these
investigations.209
203. DeRosa, supra note 198, at 6-8 (explaining that all nineteen of the September
11, 2001 hijackers were within three degrees of separation from one another, and that
they could have been connected simply by using then-current U.S. government
terrorist watch list information, flight reservation contact information, frequent flyer
numbers, and public records of the hijackers' past addresses). However, although the
FBI made some glaring mistakes, the September 11, 2001 hijackers also intentionally
avoided activities, such as affiliating with radical political groups, that traditionally
would have flagged them for special attention by authorities. See 9/11 Commission
Report, supra note 146, at 254-77 (describing "the summer of threat" leading up to
the attacks during which "the system was blinking red," but viable leads and
terrorists' mistakes were not capitalized upon by any federal agency responsible for
counter-terrorism); Terrorism and the Constitution, supra note 150, at 167 (noting
that the September 11, 2001 hijackers avoided drawing attention to themselves by
intentionally avoiding radical political affiliations).
204. Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom, and Security 64-65 (2003).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 65.
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. Despite its usefulness to detect suspicious patterns in huge quantities of data,
data mining still has important limitations. Although data mining can identify
patterns and relationships in large data sets, analysts are still necessary to assess the
patterns' significance. See Jeffrey W. Seifert, Congressional Research Serv., Data
Mining: An Overview 3 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31798.pdf.
Also, only patterns already believed to be suspicious will be identified by pattern-
based data mining because formulating the queries inherently requires a judgment of
what constitutes a suspicious behavior pattern. See Heymann, supra note 204, at 72.
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Recognizing that data mining could provide terrorism investigators
with useful information, critics nonetheless argue that the possibility
of "mission creep" further augments the Fourth Amendment
concerns surrounding administrative subpoenas.1 ° An assembled
network of information set up for data mining could easily be used to
fight crime other than terrorism.211 If data mining proves to be an
effective tool to fight terrorism, Congress could be tempted to permit
its use to help investigate the next type of high profile illegal
behavior.212  However, since administrative subpoenas access
information without probable cause, mission creep could lead to
criminal prosecutions for crimes other than terrorism on the basis of
private information obtained without probable cause.213 Data mining
experts admit that without government-wide guidelines for the future
use of information collected by administrative subpoena, mission
creep could definitely occur.214  Although such crimes may
210. In his report, Jeffrey Seifert pointed out that
[m]ission creep is one of the leading risks of data mining cited by civil
libertarians, and represents how control over one's information can be a
tenuous proposition. Mission creep refers to the use of data for purposes
other than that for which the data was originally collected. This can occur
regardless of whether the data was provided voluntarily by the individual or
was collected through other means.
Seifert, supra note 209, at 12. The possibility of mission creep also surrounds the
debate over national ID cards. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Under a Watchful Eye:
Incursions on Personal Privacy, in The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in an
Age of Terrorism, supra note 149, at 128, 145 ("A national database, however
benignly motivated, will lie about waiting to be used or misused given the right
conditions .... On the 'loaded weapon' view, liberty is best protected when data, like
political sovereignty, is sufficiently decentralized.").
211. See Seifert, supra note 209, at 13 ("[Slome experts suggest that anti-terrorism
data mining applications might also be useful for combating other types of crime as
well.").
212. DeRosa, supra note 198, at 16. "At any time, another type of illegal behavior
could take on a high profile, and authorities will be under pressure to expand the use
of these techniques, for example, to help investigate other violent criminals,
immigration law violators, or even 'deadbeat dads."' Id; see also Dep't of Defense,
Report of the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee, Safeguarding Privacy in
the Fight Against Terrorism 7 (March 2004) ("We conclude that advanced
information technology -including data mining-is a vital tool in the fight against
terrorism, but in developing and using that tool the government must-and can-
protect privacy and fundamental civil liberties."), available at
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf.
213. This concern highlights a crucial difference between administrative subpoenas
and grand jury subpoenas: Because of the strict grand jury secrecy rules, data mining
of information obtained through grand jury subpoenas would be extremely unlikely.
See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
214. DeRosa, supra note 198, at 16.
No matter how legitimate the reason for collection or how careful the initial
use, information can take on a life of its own if not controlled, and it can be
used by others for reasons unrelated to the initial collection. Currently, no
government-wide guidelines exist for collection, use, retention, and
dissemination of private data, and oversight of these activities is inconsistent
at best.
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legitimately demand authorities' attention, "there will be less
opportunity for robust public debate on... expanded use" of "new
tools once they have been implemented for one purpose"-that is,
Congress may be unable to resist sliding down a slippery slope. 215 If
Congress were to authorize the use of data mining from
administrative subpoenas for other types of crime, the breach of all
individuals' privacy would be vastly expanded, and targeted
individuals would again be subject to prosecution based upon private
information obtained without probable cause.
2. Delegation of Authority to Issue Administrative Subpoenas
Second, how far down the chain of command would subpoena
issuing power be delegated? The bills proposed in Congress would
give the Attorney General administrative subpoena power that could
be delegated to the director of the FBI, who could further delegate
the power to agents.216 In the health care context, since the Attorney
General has not delegated this power to the FBI, prosecutors'
gatekeeping power to issue the subpoenas places an informal check
on their indiscriminate use.217 Since prosecutors face "asymmetric
accountability," their interests are not wholly aligned with
investigators' interests, and a prosecutor may be less likely to risk
issuing a subpoena for an investigation unlikely to bear fruit.18
Similarly, in the terrorism context, limiting administrative subpoena
power to traditionally risk-averse prosecutors would provide an
additional check on abuses of this power.219 Although the strength of
prosecutors' gatekeeping power would hinge on their response to the
pressures of post-September 11, 2001 terrorism investigations,
prosecutors could still provide a check on agents conducting
overreaching terrorism investigations.
Id.
215. Id.; see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Checks, No Balances: Discarding
Bedrock Constitutional Principles, in The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in an
Age of Terrorism, supra note 149, at 74, 84-85 (noting that, technically, many of the
enhanced powers Congress granted the FBI since September 11, 2001 could be used
to investigate crimes other than terrorism). Although the restrictions that Congress
placed upon Medicare administrative subpoenas did strictly limit the future use of
information obtained by the subpoenas, administrative subpoenas in the terrorism
context would provide the government with a much broader range of information
that could prove valuable in many more types of criminal investigations. See supra
notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
216. See S. 2555, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 3037, 108th Cong. (2003).
217. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
219. Arguably, however, prosecutors in post-September 11, 2001 terrorism
investigations may try to overcompensate -that is, prosecutors' risk aversion would
become inclined to take risks in these investigations. If so, prosecutors would not
provide the same check on agents' eagerness to use administrative subpoenas as in
the health care fraud context.
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C. Practical Concerns: Would Administrative Subpoenas Provide Too
Much Information?
Finally, on a practical level, critics also worry that broad
investigatory tools like administrative subpoenas would provide
terrorism investigators with too much irrelevant information for the
subpoenas to be useful as an investigatory tool.220 Before September
11, 2001, the FBI's terrorism intelligence capability suffered due to
institutional shortcomings. 22' The FBI's decentralized system of
collecting intelligence, the lack of communication both within the FBI
field offices and with other agencies in possession of critical
information, and an underfunded counter-terrorism program placed
low on the agency's priority list all contributed to the FBI's failure to
piece together clues about the impending attacks.222 But while agency
reorganization can shift the FBI's focus to counter-terrorism, un-
focused and overbroad investigatory tools that sweep up large
quantities of irrelevant information could waste analysts' time as well
as other valuable resources. 223 Although administrative subpoenas
could give terrorism investigators some important information, since
the subpoenas will also cover inordinate amounts of unrelated
information, their benefit as an investigatory tool could be
outweighed by the inefficiencies they impose upon intelligence
analysts.224
III. USING ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS FOR CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE FOURTH
AMENDMENT PRIVACY RIGHTS
In the context of a criminal investigation, administrative subpoenas
conflict with the Fourth Amendment because the subpoenas allow
220. See Schulhofer, supra note 215, at 85. Professor Schulhofer noted that
[i]t is now well known that before September 11 the FBI and the Central
Intelligence Agency had important clues to the plot in hand, but as one FBI
agent put it, "We didn't know what we knew." Since a large part of what we
lack is not raw data but the ability to separate significant intelligence from
so-called noise, pulling more information into government files will not help
and may aggravate the difficulty.
Id. at 86.
221. See Joint Inquiry, supra note 146, at 79-81.
222. See 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 146, at 74-80; see also Joint Inquiry,
supra note 146, at 77-90, 336-45, 358.
223. See Whitaker, supra note 168, at 68 (noting that "as a general rule, the
collection capacity of intelligence agencies has outstripped their analytical
capacities").
224. See id. (arguing that "[some investigatory] [s]chemes... actually threaten to
worsen this [pre-9/11] imbalance [between available information and resources for
analysis], [by] swamping overworked analysts with too much information, almost all
of it irrelevant, but requiring processing"); see also Edley, supra note 186, at 185
("[W]hile it is true that the potential horror [of terrorism] exceeds that of
conventional crime, that makes it all the more important that the investigation and
enforcement strategies be effective, not merely political and symbolic.").
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government agents to bypass the probable cause requirement to
obtain private information. Although holding investigators to a lower
Fourth Amendment standard may be justified for some types of
criminal investigations, such as health care fraud,225 Congress must
carefully assess whether terrorism investigations require similar
intrusions on Fourth Amendment rights. The degree to which the
subpoenas would be an effective and useful investigatory tool should
be taken into account.226 Congress must also recognize that the use of
administrative subpoenas in terrorism investigations would seriously
undermine individuals' Fourth Amendment rights in other criminal
investigations, and Congress must be willing to justify these
consequences to the federal courts and to the public. However, if
Congress does grant the FBI administrative subpoena power for
terrorism investigations, Congress should place limitations on the
future use of information obtained with the subpoenas to avoid
further and unnecessary undermining of the probable cause
requirement for criminal investigations. Although federal courts may
still strike down such a grant of power, restrictions that prevent the
expansion of this power to non-terrorism contexts would better
comport with Fourth Amendment policies.
A. Health Care Fraud Is the Exception, Not the Rule: The Justification
for Abrogating Fourth Amendment Rights in Health Care Fraud
Investigations Is Not Compelling in Other Contexts
Under the Supreme Court's long-standing interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment, government agents acting with nothing more
than mere suspicion cannot legitimately invade individuals' privacy.2 7
The probable cause requirement reflects the framers' and ratifiers'
belief that capricious state action is unacceptable, and probable cause
sets a threshold below which state action is deemed arbitrary.228
Although the strict probable cause requirement could prevent
investigators from pursuing every available lead in an important
criminal investigation, the requirement protects innocent people from
unfair and arbitrary state privacy intrusions.29 According to long-
standing Fourth Amendment principles, using administrative
subpoenas for criminal investigations would violate the privacy rights
of huge numbers of people.23 0 Anyone, guilty or innocent, whose
private information would be accessed by the subpoenas has the right
225. See Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256,263-65 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2000); supra Parts I.C.1-C.2.
226. See supra Part II.C.
227. See supra Part I.A.1.
228. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
230. See Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 411; supra notes 13-27 and accompanying
text. For an overview of the historical context of the probable cause requirements,
see Gould & Stern, supra note 14, at 792-93 & n.65.
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to keep that information private unless the state can demonstrate
probable cause for suspicion.23'
By permitting the use of administrative subpoenas in health care
fraud investigations under HIPAA, Congress and the federal
appellate courts opened the door for criminal prosecutions based
upon evidence found in private documents that were obtained without
probable cause, seemingly in violation of the Fourth Amendment.232
However, holding investigators to a lower Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard in a health care fraud investigation makes
sense because a health care fraud investigation and an administrative
regulatory investigation present similar difficulties for investigators.233
In both administrative regulatory investigations and health care fraud
investigations, requiring probable cause could entirely undermine
investigators' efforts because private records are the determinative
evidence in the investigation; without access to these records,
investigators may never have probable cause.234 But this justification
is not persuasive in the context of other criminal investigations,
including terrorism investigations, where investigators receive critical
information from many different sources. 235  Without equally
compelling justifications, administrative subpoenas cannot be used in
terrorism and other similar investigations without seriously abrogating
individuals' Fourth Amendment rights.
B. From Probable Cause to Abandoning All Safeguards: The
Secondary Problems of Judicial Review and Mission Creep
In addition to conflicting with long-standing principles of Fourth
Amendment rights, terrorism administrative subpoenas present
serious secondary implications for Fourth Amendment rights. Two
main concerns arise: judicial review and mission creep.
First, granting administrative subpoena power for terrorism
investigations would do more than merely substitute a reasonableness
standard of review under the Fourth Amendment for the probable
cause standard. Due to the differences between health care fraud and
terrorism investigations, administrative subpoenas in the terrorism
context would afford suspects no Fourth Amendment protection at all
because judicial review will not work to weed out unreasonable
demands.236 When investigators issue an administrative subpoena
under HIPAA, the recipient is the doctor who is under
231. See Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 411; supra notes 13-27 and accompanying
text.
232. See supra Part I.C.1.
233. Compare supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text, with supra notes 165-67
and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
236. See supra Part II.A.2.
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investigation.237  If the demand is unreasonable-if it asks for
information unrelated to health care fraud, for example-it is in the
doctor-recipient's own interest to challenge the subpoena to protect
the private records from unreasonable government intrusion.238
However, in the terrorism context, the subpoena recipients will
likely be third parties not under investigation, such as internet service
providers, credit card companies, or, as in the hypothetical above,
retailers.239 Under the proposed legislation, third parties would be
absolved from any liability arising from divulging information
requested by the subpoena.24 ° While these third parties might
challenge a demand that requires access to voluminous amounts of
information that would be expensive to produce, they have no
incentive to incur the costs of litigating a motion to quash a subpoena
that presents an unreasonable invasion of their customers' private
records.241 There is also a real risk that unsophisticated subpoena
recipients will not know of their right to challenge such a demand.242
Further, since the subpoena would come directly from the FBI, and
could come with an order of secrecy, some recipients likely will be
intimidated into complying with even unreasonable demands for fear
of negative repercussions. 243  As a consequence, the administrative
subpoenas would not substitute probable cause with a lower standard
of scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment: instead, they would
substitute probable cause for no review at all, effectively granting the
FBI non-reviewable demand power to obtain private information on
which to base a criminal prosecution. For both search warrants and
administrative subpoenas, review by a neutral judicial body
legitimizes the state's invasion of individuals' privacy.2" Congress
cannot justify the use of administrative subpoenas for terrorism
investigations merely with talk of the safeguard created by judicial
review,245 because, in this context, no neutral body would protect
subpoena recipients from agency overreaching. If the FBI were
armed with administrative subpoena power, judicial review would not
guard individuals swept up in a terrorism investigation from
unreasonably intrusive demands.
237. See Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bailey,
228 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2000).
238. Doe, 253 F.3d at 256; Bailey, 228 F.3d at 341.
239. See S. 2555, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 3037, 108th Cong. (2003); supra
Introduction.
240. See S. 2555; H.R. 3037.
241. See Unchecked Power, supra note 178; supra notes 174-84 and accompanying
text.
242. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
243. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 68-70 (1963); supra notes 188-
90 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 25-27, 90-98 and accompanying text.
245. For an example of this justification, see Brand Testimony, supra note 158.
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Second, since administrative subpoenas will likely be used for data
mining, mission creep could further undermine Fourth Amendment
rights. Unlike information subpoenaed by a grand jury, information
obtained through administrative subpoenas is not subject to exacting
use restrictions.246 Even if Congress could justify abrogating Fourth
Amendment rights for the needs of terrorism investigators, data
mining conducted on the data sets retrieved by administrative
subpoenas will likely reveal other criminal activity unrelated to
terrorism. 247 For example, if the agents in the hypothetical above
248
did obtain the sales records of every hardware store in a regional area
and searched through those records for evidence of suspicious
activity, criminal activity wholly unrelated to terrorism, such as credit
card fraud, could surface. If the government used this evidence to
prosecute individuals for other, non-terrorism related crimes, the
Fourth Amendment policies effectuated by the probable cause
requirement would be further subverted. Mission creep would tacitly
enable the FBI to circumvent the probable cause requirement in
criminal investigations beyond terrorism investigations.249
C. Recommendation for Congress
Identifying the necessary and best tools to fight terrorism is far
beyond the scope of this Note. The decision to abrogate Fourth
Amendment privacy rights for the benefit of terrorism investigations
is a choice that Congress must consider, and the federal courts will
assess, in light of the circumstances. If Congress does grant the FBI
administrative subpoena power for terrorism investigations, Congress
must provide strong justifications for seriously compromising the
Fourth Amendment rights of all individuals caught up in these
investigations. However, in the alternative, Congress should also act
decisively to prevent the damage to Fourth Amendment rights from
spreading beyond the context of terrorism investigations. Specifically:
(1) Congress should prevent mission creep by placing limits on the
future use of any information obtained with administrative subpoenas
in a non-terrorism context. This could be accomplished by placing
statutory limits on the future use of any database created from
subpoenaed information for a non-terrorism criminal investigation.
The restrictions need not be as strict as grand jury secrecy
246. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. Although grand jury
subpoenas could give investigators access to similar quantities of private information
without probable cause, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure strictly limit the use
of that information. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e); see supra notes 55-63 and accompanying
text.
247. See DeRosa, supra note 198, at 16; Seifert, supra note 209, at 12-13;
Schulhofer, supra note 215, at 85; supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Introduction.
249. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 732286
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS
requirements;250 the statutory provision could parallel the provision in
HIPAA25 1 that has successfully protected patients' private information
from use in non-health care fraud investigations.252 Congress could
also require regular reporting by the Attorney General on the
measures taken to prevent misuse of the database. As in the health
care fraud context, this will keep the probable cause requirement
intact in other investigations where the reasonableness standard
remains inappropriate. 3
(2) Congress should explicitly confine any administrative subpoena
issuing power to as few persons as possible. In the terrorism context,
the subpoenas will not be subject to neutral review for
reasonableness 4.25  However, if agents directly involved in an
investigation must seek review from outside their own agency, albeit
in another executive department, review by a party removed from the
investigation would subject the subpoenas' reasonableness to
questioning by a more neutral party. Although this informal check
would not provide the same balance as review by neutral judicial
officers, at the very least such informal gatekeeping power and
prosecutors' asymmetrical accountability could prevent blatantly
unreasonable agency demands and extreme cases of agency
overreaching. 5
These suggestions place only mild checks on administrative
subpoena power and would not protect the privacy rights of terrorism
administrative subpoena recipients. However, these checks will
prevent the further erosion of Fourth Amendment rights in non-
terrorism contexts absent public debate. Even if Congress can justify
abrogating Fourth Amendment privacy rights for terrorism
investigations, these checks would uphold Fourth Amendment
policies in other criminal investigations.
CONCLUSION
By giving administrative subpoena power to prosecutors for health
care fraud cases under HIPAA, Congress sanctioned the use of civil
Fourth Amendment standards in criminal investigations and
subsequent prosecutions. 56  Given the Department of Justice's
success with administrative subpoenas in the health care fraud
context, granting administrative subpoena power to terrorism
250. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e).
251. 18 U.S.C. § 3486(e) (2000).
252. See DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 35.
253. See supra Part I.C.3.
254. See supra Part II.A.2.
255. See supra Part I.C.4.
256. See Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 263-64 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v.




investigators could be an effective way to help prevent a crime with
infinitely high social costs. 257 However, because health care fraud
investigations are not analogous to terrorism investigations, Congress
should not give the FBI additional administrative subpoena power
without compelling reasons for abrogating long-standing principles of
Fourth Amendment rights. Even if Congress could justify granting
administrative subpoena power to the FBI for terrorism
investigations, Congress must still take additional action to ensure
that Fourth Amendment rights in other criminal investigations are not
similarly undermined.
257. See 150 Cong. Rec. S7179-80 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl
explaining the provisions of S. 2555); Updating the Law, supra note 7; supra notes
144-52 and accompanying text.
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